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MANAGING MIGRATION THROUGH CRIME 
Jennifer M. Chacón∗ 
In recent years, an increasing number of scholars and 
commentators have turned their attention to the criminalization of 
migration in the United States.1  These scholars have focused on three 
distinct trends:  the increasingly harsh criminal consequences attached 
to violations of laws regulating migration,2 the use of removal as an 
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1. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders:  Immigration Restrictions, 
Crime Control and National Security, 39 Conn. L. Rev. 1827, 1827–32 (2007) [hereinafter 
Chacón, Unsecured Borders] (outlining “origins and consequences of the blurred 
boundaries between immigration control, crime control, and national security”); Daniel 
Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented:  Ironic Boundaries of the Post-September 
11th “Pale of Law,” 29 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 639, 640 (2004) [hereinafter 
Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented] (considering “convergence between the 
immigration and criminal justice systems”); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of 
Immigration Law:  Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 Wash. & Lee 
L. Rev. 469, 471–72 (2007) [hereinafter Legomsky, Asymmetric Incorporation] 
(describing “growing convergence” of criminal justice and immigration control systems); 
Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime Control After 
September 11th, 25 B.C. Third World L.J. 81, 83–86 (2005) (describing consequences of 
interaction between criminal justice and immigration law); Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship & 
Severity:  Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 611, 
616–20 (2003) [hereinafter Miller, Citizenship & Severity] (describing criminalization of 
immigration law); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis:  Immigrants, Crime, and 
Sovereign Power, 56 Am. U. L. Rev. 367, 376–77 (2006) [hereinafter Stumpf, 
Crimmigration Crisis] (noting “intense interest” in “crimmigration law”). 
2. See, e.g., Chacón, Unsecured Borders, supra note 1, at 1844 (noting 1996 
immigration laws “impos[ed] a system of tough penalties that favor removal even in cases 
involving relatively minor infractions or very old crimes”); Kanstroom, Criminalizing the 
Undocumented, supra note 1, at 640 (noting post-9/11 push to criminalize “unlawful 
presence in the United States”); Legomsky, Asymmetric Incorporation, supra note 1, at 
476–82 (describing expansion of immigration-related criminal offenses); Miller, 
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adjunct to criminal punishment in cases involving noncitizens,3 and the 
rising reliance on criminal law enforcement actors and mechanisms in 
civil immigration proceedings.4  One major effect of these three trends 
has been the incorporation of criminal law methodologies into the realm 
of civil immigration enforcement and adjudication.  Recently, Stephen 
Legomsky has theorized the asymmetric nature of this incorporation.5  
As he explains, the “theories, methods, perceptions, and priorities” of 
criminal law enforcement have been incorporated into immigration 
proceedings, while the procedural protections of criminal adjudication 
have been explicitly rejected.6  His analysis focuses on how the 
criminalization of migration is reshaping the realm of civil immigration 
proceedings. 
In contrast, this Essay centralizes and attempts to theorize the 
criminal prosecutions of migration-related offenses.7  Part I of this Essay 
describes this trend.  Specifically, Part I.A highlights the ways in which 
the regulation of migration has increasingly become a subject of the 
criminal law.  Part I.B discusses the explosion of migration-related 
criminal prosecutions over the past few years. 
Part II of this Essay provides several examples of the use of criminal 
prosecutions in the migration context in order to explore an 
 
Citizenship & Severity, supra note 1, at 617 (describing “stiff criminal penalties” for 
immigration violations); Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion:  The Rise of State and 
Local Power Over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 1557, 1589–92 (2008) [hereinafter 
Stumpf, States of Confusion] (describing imposition of criminal penalties for violations of 
immigration-related laws).  
3. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Whose Community Shield?:  Examining the 
Removal of the “Criminal Street Gang Member”, 2007 U. Chi. Legal F. 317, 321–24 
[hereinafter Chacón, Whose Community Shield?] (describing use of revised immigration 
laws and removal proceedings to disrupt gangs); Kanstroom, Criminalizing the 
Undocumented, supra note 1, at 653 (“After the criminal justice system has completed its 
work, the removal system begins.”); Legomsky, Asymmetric Incorporation, supra note 1, 
at 482–86 (describing “proliferation of new crime-related deportation grounds”); Miller, 
Citizenship & Severity, supra note 1, at 614 (“[C]riminal grounds for deporting non-
citizens that were previously quite limited and enforced with laxity have been greatly 
expanded in scope and are now strictly enforced through a variety of mechanisms and 
institutional arrangements that have produced unprecedented cooperation between 
criminal and immigration law enforcement.”).  
4. See, e.g., Chacón, Whose Community Shield?, supra note 3, at 339–43 (describing 
participation of criminal enforcement officers in immigration proceedings); Anil Kalhan, 
The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Implications of Interior Immigration Enforcement, 
41 U.C. Davis L. Rev 1137, 1161–63 (2008) (describing increased role of state and local 
officials in enforcement of immigration laws); Legomsky, Asymmetric Incorporation, 
supra note 1, at 489–500 (describing importation of criminal law enforcement strategies 
to immigration law); Stumpf, States of Confusion, supra note 2, at 1595 (“Several post-
September 11, 2001 federal actions have had the effect of drawing state and local police 
into indirectly enforcing immigration law.”); Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police 
Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1084, 1084–88 (2004) (discussing 
entry of civil immigration violations into NCIC database). 
5. See generally Legomsky, Asymmetric Incorporation, supra note 1. 
6. Id. at 472. 
7. Legomsky discusses these prosecutions, but they are not central to his analysis.  Id. 
at 481. 
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undertheorized effect of this trend, namely, that the protective features 
of criminal investigation and adjudication are melting away at the edges 
in certain criminal cases involving migration-related offenses.  Part II.A 
explores the border-centered prosecutions of Operation Streamline and 
the more geographically diffuse Fast Track program aimed at felony 
reentries.  Part II.B focuses upon the use of criminal prosecutions in 
worksite immigration enforcement efforts.  Part II.C diagnoses the ways 
in which these proceedings reflect declining procedural protections in 
the realm of criminal prosecutions for immigration-related offenses. 
As these examples make clear, not only are we seeing what Stephen 
Legomsky has termed the asymmetric incorporation of criminal justice 
norms into civil removal proceedings, but we are also witnessing the 
importation of the relaxed procedural norms of civil immigration 
proceedings into the criminal realm. 
I.  REGULATING MIGRATION THROUGH CRIME 
The regulation of migration has long taken place primarily in the 
civil sphere.8  In recent years, however, the U.S. government has 
increasingly handled migration control through the criminal justice 
system.  Part I.A discusses the legislation that Congress and various state 
legislatures have enacted to criminalize acts associated with migration.  
Part I.B. describes the recent upward spike in prosecutions of these 
migration-related offenses.  
A.  Creating and Enhancing Criminal Sanctions for Offenses Relating to 
Migration 
Since the 1980s, Congress has passed legislation subjecting more 
and more acts associated with migration to criminal penalties, or 
increasing the severity of criminal sanctions imposed for the commission 
of those acts.9  Criminal offenses newly created in the 1980s included the 
hiring of unauthorized noncitizen workers,10 reliance on false 
documents to evade employer sanctions laws,11 and marriage fraud.12  In 
the late 1980s and the 1990s, illegal reentry provisions were added and 
 
8. See Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment:  Some 
Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1890, 1899–913 
(2000) [hereinafter Kanstroom, Hard Laws] (discussing early history of migration 
regulation). 
9. See sources cited supra note 2; see also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside 
the Law, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 2037, 2087–88 (2008) (“Criminalization has been the trend 
since the 1990s, when Congress increased penalties for existing immigration-related 
crimes, such as smuggling and various types of document fraud, and added several new 
immigration-related crimes.”).  
10. Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006). 
11. IRCA § 103(a). 
12. Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 § 2(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c) 
(2006). 
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strengthened,13 as were various fraud provisions relating to the processes 
of seeking immigration benefits and citizenship.14  And in 2000, 
penalties were raised for various offenses relating to trafficking in 
persons.15 
Although the criminalization of migration-related offenses used to 
be entirely federal in nature, in recent years, states and localities have 
added a host of anti-loitering laws and other similar ordinances that are 
clearly intended to—and have been used to—facilitate the criminal 
prosecution of unauthorized migrants at the state and local level.16  One 
example is Arizona’s version of the identity theft law.  The crime—
entitled “Taking identity of another person or entity”—creates criminal 
culpability for the use of an alternate identity whether or not the 
defendant knows that he is using the identity of an actual person and 
whether or not another person with such an identity actually exists.17  
This offense, which does not require theft of an actual identity, can be 
deployed as a means of prosecuting noncitizens who have used false 
identities to obtain employment in cases where there is no loss to anyone 
as a result of the use of that identity.  Several other states have also 
 
13. See, e.g., Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 § 7345, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006) (increasing 
criminal sentences for unlawful reentry); Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement 
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 130001(b), 108 Stat. 1796, 2023 (codified as amended 
at 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1) (2006)) (criminalizing reentry after commission of three or more 
enumerated misdemeanors). 
14. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C. §§ 213–215, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e) 
(2006), 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (2006), and 18 U.S.C. § 1015(e)–(f) (2006)). 
15. See Jennifer M. Chacón, Misery and Myopia:  Understanding the Failures of U.S. 
Efforts to Stop Human Trafficking, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 2977, 2992–93 (2006) 
[hereinafter Chacón, Misery and Myopia] (discussing criminal provisions added or 
enhanced by Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) of 2000). 
16. See Legomsky, Asymmetric Incorporation, supra note 1, at 496–98 (discussing 
IIRIRA encouragement of “use of state and local criminal enforcement machinery to 
bolster the INS civil immigration enforcement efforts”); Karla Mari McKanders, Welcome 
to Hazelton!  “Illegal” Immigrants Beware:  Local Immigration Ordinances and What the 
Federal Government Must Do About It, 39 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 1, 6–13 (2007) (discussing 
municipal legislation in Hazelton, PA, Altoona, PA, and San Bernardino, CA); Michael A. 
Olivas, Immigration-Related State and Local Ordinances:  Preemption, Prejudice, and the 
Proper Role for Enforcement, 2007 U. Chi. Legal F. 27, 31–33 (“[F]rom January through 
June, 2006, almost 500 immigration-related bills had been introduced in state legislatures, 
and 44 had been enacted, in 19 states.”); Christina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the 
Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 567, 581–90 (2008) (discussing 
examples in Illinois, North Carolina, and Iowa); Stumpf, States of Confusion, supra note 
2, at 1596–600 (discussing examples of local criminal enforcement in North Carolina, 
Illinois, Oklahoma, California, Wyoming, New York, and Pennsylvania); Rick Su, A 
Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 1619, 1642–49 (2008) 
(using Town of Hazelton in Eastern Pennsylvania to discuss theory of indirect regulation 
at local level). 
17. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2008 (Supp. 2008) (criminalizing “Taking identity 
of another person or entity; knowingly accepting identity of another person; 
classification”); § 13-2009 (criminalizing “Aggravated taking identity of another person or 
entity; classification”); § 13-2010 (criminalizing “Trafficking in the identity of another 
person or entity; classification”). 
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enacted provisions that mirror federal prohibitions on immigration 
crimes like smuggling and harboring of unauthorized migrants and false 
proof of citizenship or immigration status.18  These statutes take 
advantage of federally created immigration categories to create a space 
for local enforcement.19  
B.  Increasing Prosecutions for Immigration Offenses 
Related to, but even more striking than the steady increase in 
migration-related criminal offenses is the rising tidal wave of 
immigration-related criminal prosecutions of the past decade.  After 
remaining relatively flat in the period from 1986 to 1996, the number of 
immigration prosecutions almost quadrupled over the next ten years.20  
The prosecution of migration-related offenses exploded in the wake of 
September 11, 2001.  In 2004, U.S. magistrates convicted 15,662 
noncitizens of immigration crimes, and U.S. district court judges 
convicted another 15,546.21  The numbers continued to climb 
thereafter.22  Since 2004, immigration prosecutions have topped the list 
of federal criminal prosecutions, outstripping federal drug and weapons 
prosecutions, and dwarfing many other forms of federal criminal 
prosecutions.23  This trend has continued even with the change in 
presidential administrations.24  And, as previously noted, states and 
localities—long thought to be excluded from the enforcement of 
 
18. See Stumpf, States of Confusion, supra note 2, at 1599 n.224 (citing examples 
from Oklahoma, Tennessee, California, Oregon, and Wyoming).  An expanding number 
of states and localities have also targeted employers and landlords who hire or enter into 
contracts with unauthorized migrants.  See id. (discussing ordinances in Escondido, 
California, Suffolk County, New York, and Hazleton, Pennsylvania); see also McKanders, 
supra note 16, at 6–13 (discussing ordinances in Hazelton, PA, Altoona, PA, and San 
Bernardino, CA). 
19. See Su, supra note 16, at 1642 (describing trend as “indirect regulations of 
immigration”). 
20. TRAC, Graphical Highlights:  DHS Criminal Enforcement Trends (2005), at 
http://trac.syr.edu/tracins/highlights/v04/dhstrendsG.html (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review). 
21. TRAC, Graphical Highlights:  Offenses Differ by Court (2005), at 
http://trac.syr.edu/tracins/highlights/v04/dhsoffcourtG.html (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review).  The vast majority of these prosecutions are for illegal entry and illegal 
reentry.  Id. 
22. Spencer S. Hsu, Immigration Prosecutions Hit New High, Wash. Post, June 2, 
2008, at A1.  
23. TRAC, New Findings:  Department of Homeland Security (2005), at 
http://trac.syr.edu/tracins/latest/131/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(“[I]mmigration matters now represent the single largest group of all federal 
prosecutions, about one third (32%) of the total.  By comparison, narcotics and drugs, for 
many years the government’s dominant enforcement interest, dropped to about a quarter 
of the total (27%) and weapons matters to slightly less than one out of ten (9%).”). 
24. TRAC, ICE Criminal Prosecutions Continue to Rise Under Obama (2009), at 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/216/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(“[A]t least through the first five months of the Obama Administration there has been no 
let up in the increase in criminal prosecutions as a result of ICE’s enforcement 
activities.”).  
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immigration law—have found ways to use their own criminal laws to 
supplement these federal prosecutions. 
These trends have attracted the notice of immigration scholars,25 
but have not received much concerted attention from criminal law 
scholars.  Indeed, the restoration of some semblance of rationality to the 
discourse on the war on crime has perhaps drawn attention away from 
the parallel trend whereby the tools formerly used to fight the war on 
crime are increasingly put to use against noncitizens.26  The lack of 
attention to the unprecedented criminalization of migration by scholars 
of criminal law and procedure is unfortunate because, like the war on 
drugs that preceded it,27 the emerging use of the criminal justice system 
to attack the social problem of unauthorized migration carries with it 
distinct procedural and social consequences that are worthy of sustained 
attention.  In the next Part, I provide a few examples to illustrate this 
point.  
II.  DECLINING PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS IN THE CRIMINAL SPHERE 
The well-known constitutional maxim that deportation (now 
“removal”)
28
 is not punishment provides longstanding precedent for 
 
25. See, e.g., Chacón, Unsecured Borders, supra note 1, at 1847 (describing “new 
enforcement actions that . . . feed and fuel the notion of dangerous classes of aliens”); 
Legomsky, Asymmetric Incorporation, supra note 1, at 479 (noting escalation of 
immigration-related criminal prosecutions beginning in 1980s); see also Stumpf, The 
Crimmigration Crisis, supra note 1, at 388 (“For the first time, immigration prosecutions 
outnumber all other types of federal criminal prosecutions, including prosecutions for 
drugs and weapons violations.”); Abby Sullivan, Note, On Thin ICE:  Cracking Down on 
the Racial Profiling of Immigrants and Implementing a Compassionate Enforcement 
Policy, 6 Hastings Race & Poverty L.J. 101, 117 (2009) (providing statistics showing 
“notable leap” in immigrants serving federal prison terms). 
26. For examples of literature that examine the former phenomenon, see After the 
War on Crime 2 (Mary Louise Frampton, Ian Haney López & Jonathan Simon eds. 2008). 
27. For discussion of the procedural and social consequences of the war on drugs, 
see, e.g., Erik Luna, Drug Exceptionalism, 47 Vill. L. Rev. 753, 754–57 (2002) (discussing 
procedural consequences of war on drugs); Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth 
Amendment, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 333, 340–42 (1998) (addressing social impact of procedural 
changes); William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the War on Terror, 111 Yale L.J. 2137, 
2160 (2002) (noting war on crime transformed criminal procedure and hypothesizing 
that war on terror will do same); Loïc Wacquant, The Place of the Prison in the New 
Government of Poverty, in After the War on Crime, supra note 26, at 27 (discussing social 
consequences of mass incarceration). 
28. Until 1996, immigration proceedings to prevent noncitizens from entering the 
country were termed “exclusion” proceedings, while proceedings to remove a noncitizen 
that had already entered the country were termed “deportation” proceedings.  See 
Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy 420–21 (5th ed. 2009). 
IIRIRA consolidated exclusion and deportation, and labeled the resulting proceedings 
“removal” proceedings.  IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, §§ 304, 308, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–
597 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e) (2006), 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (2006), and 18 U.S.C. § 
1015(e)–(f) (2006)) §§ 304, 308.  Now, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(3) indicates that the removal 
proceedings defined in that section are for determining “whether an alien may be 
admitted to the United States or, if the alien has been so admitted, removed from the 
United States.”  
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important legal distinctions between civil immigration proceedings and 
criminal proceedings.
29
  Noncitizens in removal proceedings are not 
entitled to counsel at the government’s expense.
30
  Evidence obtained in 
violation of a noncitizen’s constitutional rights generally is not subject to 
suppression in civil removal proceedings.
31
  And immigration 
detention—which is also not legal “punishment”—is not subject to the 
same constitutional constraints as criminal detention.
32
  These 
distinctions have frequently caused immigration attorneys to yearn for 
the constitutional protections of criminal proceedings,
33
 even while 
acknowledging the inadequacies of those protections. 
Unfortunately, recent developments suggest that the lower 
standards of procedural protections that apply in removal proceedings 
have made ultra vires incursions into the criminal realm.  For purposes 
of this Essay, a few examples suffice to illustrate the problem.  Part II.A 
outlines two programs aimed at addressing the crimes of entry without 
inspection and felony reentry.  Part II.B discusses prosecutions arising 
out of a worksite raid.  Part II.C addresses the declining procedural 
protections in the realm of criminal prosecutions for migration-related 
offenses.34 
 
29. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896) (distinguishing hard 
labor, which is punishment, from deportation, which is not); Fong Yue Ting v. United 
States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893) (suggesting congressional power with regard to 
deportation is virtually limitless); see also Kanstroom, Hard Laws, supra note 8, at 1895 
(discussing and contesting maxim). 
30. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984). 
31. See id. at 1050 (holding exclusionary rule generally does not apply in 
deportation proceedings, but could apply if constitutional violations were “egregious”).  
The Court also discussed the possibility of applying the exclusionary rule in removal 
proceedings if violations became “widespread.”  Id.  For arguments that this threshold has 
been reached, see Stella Burch Elias, Good Reason to Believe:  Widespread Constitutional 
Violations in the Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for Revisiting Lopez-
Mendoza, 2008 Wis. L. Rev. 1109, 1109 (arguing that “constitutional violations by 
immigration officers have become . . . geographically and institutionally widespread in the 
years since Lopez-Mendoza”); Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of 
Immigration Laws, 6 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1084, 1114 (2004) (noting that “[u]nder the logic 
of Lopez-Mendoza itself, the exclusionary rule may now be appropriate in immigration 
proceedings” given widespread evidence of racial profiling in immigration enforcement). 
32. Margaret H. Taylor, Dangerous by Decree:  Detention Without Bond in 
Immigration Proceedings, 50 Loy. L. Rev. 149, 150 (2004) (discussing uses of immigration 
detention since September 11, 2001 to circumvent constitutional limitations on 
detention). 
33. See, e.g., Burch Elias, supra note 31, at 1114 (arguing for adoption of 
exclusionary rule in removal proceedings); Wishnie, supra note 31, at 1114 (same). 
34. Not discussed here, but also relevant, is the development of case law concluding 
that certain undocumented migrants in the United States—such as felony reentrants—are 
not entitled to the protections of the Fourth Amendment at all.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1273–74 (D. Utah 2003) (denying motion for 
suppression of evidence under Fourth Amendment due to alien defendant’s “lack of 
substantial sufficient connection” to United States); see also M. Isabel Medina, Exploring 
the Use of the Word “Citizen” in Writings on the Fourth Amendment, 83 Ind. L.J. 1557 
(2008) (discussing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that incorrectly suggests right is 
limited to citizens). 
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A.  Criminal Prosecutions for Unlawful Entries 
Because there are hundreds of thousands of unauthorized border 
crossings each year,35 prosecuting every misdemeanor unlawful border 
crossing would require a prohibitive outlay of additional governmental 
resources.  Nevertheless, in recent years the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
has made an effort to significantly increase the number of immigration 
prosecutions.36  Consequently, the number of such prosecutions 
ballooned—from just over 18,000 in 2001 to over 35,000 in 2007.37 
1.  Operation Streamline. — A significant portion of these 
prosecutions have taken place under the auspices of Operation 
Streamline.38  Under the Operation Streamline program, all unlawful 
entrants interdicted by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in a 
designated sector of the border region are criminally prosecuted.39  In 
Tucson, Arizona, for example, about fifty to one hundred defendants are 
prosecuted for illegal entry every single day.40  The picture is similar in 
 
35. Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, Pew Hispanic Ctr., Trends in Unauthorized 
Immigration:  Undocumented Inflow Now Trails Legal Inflow, at i (2008), available at 
http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=94 (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (“[I]nflows of unauthorized immigrants averaged 800,000 a year from 2000 to 
2004, but fell to 500,000 a year from 2005 to 2008 with a decreasing year-to-year trend”). 
36. John Grasty Crews, II, The Executive Office for United States Attorneys’ 
Involvement in Immigration Law Enforcement, U.S. Attorney’s Bull., Nov. 2008, at 1, 2, 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usab5606.pdf (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review) (describing “increase[d] misdemeanor prosecutions along 
the southwest border”). 
37. Id. 
38. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Operation Streamline Nets 
1,200-Plus Prosecutions in Arizona (June 24, 2007), available at 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/archives/2007_news_releases/0
72007/07242007_3.xml (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting 1,200 of 2,800 
immigration prosecutions in Yuma sector of Arizona took place under auspices of 
Operation Streamline). 
39. The designated sector is not fixed, but changes over time, and usually covers a 
fifteen to twenty mile stretch of the border region.  The notion is that all entrants in that 
sector will be prosecuted, but because available criminal detention facilities (and the 
courts) are not designed to accommodate such a mass of pretrial inmates, apprehended 
individuals who pose particular challenges (such as women and individuals who speak 
languages other than Spanish) are often released without being prosecuted.  Telephone 
Interview with Jon Sands, Fed. Pub. Defender, Dist. of Ariz. (Oct. 21, 2009) [hereinafter 
Sands Interview] (notes on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
40. Id.; see also United States v. Roblero-Solis, No. 08-10396, 2009 WL 4282022, at *1 
(9th Cir. Dec. 2, 2009) (describing one particular mass plea agreement and noting that 
“in twelve months’ time the court has handled 25,000” of these pleas); Brief of Defendant-
Appellants at 6, United States v. Roblero-Solis, Nos. 08-10396, 08-10397, 08-10466, 08-
10509, 08-10512, 08-10543 (consolidated) (9th Cir. Apr. 6, 2009) (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Roblero-Solis Brief] (describing Streamline plea 
proceeding); Oversight Hearing on the Executive Office for United States Attorneys, 
Before the H.R. S. Comm. on Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 10 (2008) (Statement of Heather E. Williams, Federal Public 
Defender, District of Arizona), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Williams080625.pdf (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) [hereinafter Williams Testimony] (tracking prosecution caseloads after 
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other jurisdictions where Streamline has been implemented.41  During 
these proceedings, defense counsel represents anywhere from six to 
eight defendants to as many as thirty or forty defendants.42  Defense 
counsel typically converses briefly with each defendant to establish 
whether they might have any defenses (such as citizenship, authorization 
to enter, or claims of entering pursuant to a lawful inspection), but if no 
such issue is raised, counsel generally participates in the entry of mass 
pleas on behalf of his or her multiple clients.43 
2.  “Fast Track” Proceedings. — Illegal entry cases are not the only 
cases fueling the upward spiral in immigration-related prosecution.  
Previously removed individuals who are apprehended after returning to 
the United States can be charged with felony reentry—a crime that now 
carries a sentence of up to twenty years if the prior removal was a result 
of conviction for an aggravated felony.44  Felony reentry prosecutions 
and convictions are already rapidly on the rise throughout the United 
States.45  In districts that demonstrate to the DOJ that they have “an 
exceptionally large number” of illegal reentry cases that will 
“significantly strain[]” prosecutorial resources, the DOJ can authorize 
prosecutors to offer “Fast Track” sentences in illegal reentry cases that 
are significantly below the federal guidelines.46  As in the Streamline 
context, the relatively light sentences generate ready pleas from the vast 
majority of those apprehended and charged with felony reentry. 
B.  Postville:  Aggravated Identity Theft Pleas 
The routinized mass plea agreements that characterize border 
justice are not limited to the southern border.  Attorneys from ICE and 
CBP who have been cross-designated as “Special Assistant United States 
 
implementation of Operation Streamline); David Bacon, Railroading Immigrants, The 
Nation, Oct. 6, 2008, at 20 (same). 
41. See Williams Testimony, supra note 40, at 5–7 (discussing developments in Del 
Rio, TX, Laredo, TX, and Yuma, AZ); see also David McLemore, Border Patrol Gets 
Tough in Laredo, Dallas Morning News, Nov. 1, 2007, available at 
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/world/mexico/stories/110207dnt
exlaredo.3584a01.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing twenty-seven 
defendants in South Texas Streamline prosecution “lined up three deep” and entering 
plea in unison after brief discussion with federal defender). 
42. Sands Interview, supra note 39. 
43. Id.; see also Roblero-Solis, 2009 WL 4282022, at *2 (describing one such mass plea 
agreement); Roblero-Solis Brief, supra note 40, at 10–14 (describing mass plea system).  
Sentencing also takes place en masse, in smaller groups of fifteen or twenty.  Id. at 15. 
44. 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006). 
45. See, e.g., TRAC, Immigration Convictions for July 2009, at 
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/immigration/monthlyjul09/gui/ (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2009) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting convictions under § 1326 
comprise about ten percent of convictions by magistrate judges for immigration 
violations). 
46. See Alison Seigler, Disparities and Discretion in Fast-Track Sentencing, 21 Fed. 
Sent’g Rep. 299, 299, 303 (2009) (noting DOJ arguments in favor of Fast-Track program).  
One result of the program is massive sentencing disparities between Fast-Track and non-
Fast-Track jurisdictions.  Id at 299.   
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Attorneys” (SAUSAs) have been assigned to the southern border regions 
to assist with illegal entry and felony reentry prosecutions, but they have 
also been dispatched to assist in criminal prosecutions at the sites of 
interior workplace raids47 like the one that took place at the 
Agriprocessors plant in Postville, Iowa on May 12, 2008.48 
Of the approximately 1,000 workers in the Postville plant, ICE 
officers arrested about 390 workers on the day of the raids.49  A number 
of these arrestees were released for humanitarian reasons, but the rest—
just over 300 people—were detained for prosecution.50  Over the course 
of the next few days, 297 of them pled guilty to aggravated identity theft 
based on their use of false documents to obtain employment.51 
In reality, many of those who pled guilty to aggravated identity theft 
probably did not satisfy the mens rea requirement of the charge because 
they had no knowledge that they were taking the identity of an existing 
person.  The legal soundness of charging identity theft in cases where 
there is no evidence of such knowledge was in doubt even at the time of 
the Postville raids, and less than two years after these events, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts that had required such 
knowledge as an element of the federal identity theft provision.52 
As with the border prosecutions, however, the government 
proceeded on the theory—in hindsight, a seemingly erroneous one—
that few of the arrestees would have valid legal defenses to the charges.  
Yet the combined threat of lengthy pretrial detention, coupled with the 
threat of a two-year prison sentence, prompted almost all of the arrestees 
to plead guilty in exchange for a five-month sentence.53  The defendants 
who pled guilty were also ordered removed by the same judge even 
though the provisions of immigration law allowing for such judicial 
orders of removal did not actually apply in these cases.54  The Postville 
 
47. Crews, II, supra note 36, at 3. 
48. Nigel Duara, William Petrosky & Grant Schulte, Claims of ID Fraud Lead to 
Largest Raid in State History, Des Moines Reg., May 12, 2008, available at 
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080512/NEWS/80512
012/1001 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
49. Erik Camayd-Freixas, Interpreting After the Largest ICE Raid in US History:  A 
Personal Account, 7 J. Latino Stud. 123, 125 (2009).  Warrants existed for an additional 




51. See Julia Preston, 270 Illegal Immigrants Sent to Prison in Federal Push, N.Y. 
Times, May 24, 2008, at A1 (“The unusually swift proceedings, in which 297 immigrants 
pleaded guilty and were sentenced in four days, were criticized by criminal defense 
lawyers, who warned of violations of due process.”).   
52. Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886, 1888 (2009) (holding 
aggravated identity theft statute requires showing that defendant knew identification used 
belonged to another person). 
53. Camayd-Freixas, supra note 49, at 5.  But cf. Peter R. Moyers, Butchering Statutes:  
The Postville Raids and the Misinterpretation of Federal Criminal Law, 32 U. Seattle L. 
Rev. 651, 673–74 (2009) (taking issue with Camayd-Freixas’s conclusion that pleas were 
“coerced,” noting that this was not true in strict legal sense, although pleas “were the 
product of a subtle systemic coercion”). 
54. Moyers, supra note 53, at 688 (noting entire plea arrangement relied upon 
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prosecutions are the clearest example to date of the ways in which mass 
plea agreements can be deployed in immigration-related prosecutions 
even outside of the border context. 
C.  Diagnosing the Harms 
Arguably, the mass plea agreements used as a means of migration 
control can do little harm since many defendants probably have no good 
legal defenses to the charges, particularly in cases involving entry without 
inspection or felony reentry.  Moreover, most defendants who have valid 
defenses such as derivative citizenship or an invalid prior removal order 
will presumably be identified by the defenders who meet briefly with the 
client prior to entry of the plea.55  Nevertheless, even if these 
assumptions are true, these mass plea proceedings have a corrosive effect 
on the administration of justice.  I address three specific problems here, 
but there are many others.56 
First, this approach ensures that abuses that take place at the stage 
of investigation and detention are not addressed by the courts.  For 
example, with regard to Operation Streamline, it may be fair to assume 
that many of the arrests made by CBP officials comport with CBP’s 
internal regulations and the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, 
but that is certainly not always the case.57  Yet, when allegations of 
misconduct surface in the context of Streamline’s mass plea agreements, 
the affected migrant is generally released and charges dropped—
otherwise, the government has to take a border patrol officer off the line 
to testify.58  With thousands of potential defendants crossing the border 
each day, it is simply easier to drop charges against one migrant than 
defend against allegations of constitutional violations.59  From a resource 
perspective, this makes perfect sense.  The problem is that it removes any 
 
misinterpretations of federal identity theft provision and relevant removal provisions); see 
also Sioban Albiol, R. Linus Chan & Sarah J. Diaz, Re-Interpreting Postville:  A Legal 
Perspective, 2 DePaul J. Soc. Just. 31, 64 (2008) (arguing reliance on judicial removal 
provision of immigration law was inappropriate in these cases). 
55. The amount of time spent by an attorney with a particular client varies.  In 
Arizona, public defenders typically represent six or seven defendants at each Streamline 
hearing and are able to spend around fifteen minutes talking to each client before a plea 
is entered.  Williams Testimony, supra note 40, at 4; Sands Interview, supra note 39.  
Resources are stretched more thinly in places like the Southern District of Texas, where 
there are fewer panel lawyers to represent Streamline defendants, and defense counsel 
can represent as many as thirty to forty defendants in a proceeding.  See Sands Interview, 
supra note 39; see also McLemore, supra note 41 (“27 people were brought before U.S. 
Magistrate Adriana Arce-Flores to enter a plea for misdemeanor illegal entry.  A federal 
public defender visited briefly with each one as they lined up three deep . . . .”). 
56. See Williams Testimony, supra note 40, at 10–16 (listing numerous administrative 
costs, health risks and potential constitutional violations resulting from Streamline 
system). 
57. See, e.g., United States v. Rangel-Portillo, No. 08-40803, 2009 WL 3429563, at *5 
(5th Cir. Oct. 27, 2009) (holding CBP lacked reasonable suspicion to stop defendant’s car 
and therefore conducted illegal search). 
58. Sands Interview, supra note 39.   
59. Id. 
146 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW SIDEBAR [Vol. 109:135 
possibility of deterrence through suppression in the course of criminal 
proceedings.  Rogue agents have a much greater chance of non-
detection in this system, particularly because there is almost no chance 
of an impoverished migrant bringing—much less winning—a civil suit 
from outside of the country after removal. 
Second, the proceedings engage the justice system in a process that 
is, at best, tremendously dehumanizing.  Individuals picked up along the 
border, many of them who have been in the elements for some time, are 
brought in shackles en masse to a courthouse after a period of detention 
(usually overnight), often in the same clothes they wore over the course 
of their journey.60  Their only individualized contact in a foreign 
criminal justice system is a very brief conversation with a public 
defender.  These prosecutions have already changed the face of federal 
prisons.  As a result of aggressive immigration prosecutions, Latinos are 
increasingly overrepresented in U.S. prisons.61  The “browning” of 
federal prisons62 ironically feeds the erroneous but rampant perception 
that immigrants have a higher propensity to commit crimes,63 thus 
generating a feedback loop of popular pressure that drives even more 
aggressive immigration enforcement.64 
Finally, the group setting of the Streamline and Postville style 
processes creates an inherently pressured situation where individuals 
may well be reluctant to speak up to raise individual concerns.  Such an 
effort would be an aberration and would seem to run contrary to the 
preferences of judges seeking to run expedient proceedings.65  
Moreover, even if most pleas are legitimate, serious questions remain as 
 
60. One visitor to the courthouse recalls being told by the bailiff to sit far away from 
the mass of defendants because of “the smell.”  Interview with Doralina Skidmore, 
President, Immigration Law Student Ass’n, Univ. of Ariz., in Tucson, Ariz. (Oct. 3, 2009).  
Defendants “can smell pretty ripe.”  Sands Interview, supra note 39. 
61. Mark Hugo Lopez & Michael T. Light, Pew Hispanic Ctr., A Rising Share:  
Hispanics and Federal Crime, at i (2009), available at 
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/104.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(noting by 2007, Hispanics accounted for forty percent of federal prisoners, which was 
triple their representation in general population, and tracing trend to rise in immigration 
prosecutions). 
62. Ian Haney-López, Post-Racial Racism:  Policing Race in the Age of Obama 133 
(U.C. Berkeley Pub. Law Research Paper No. 1418212, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1418212 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).  
63. See, e.g., Ruben G. Rumbaut et al., Debunking the Myth of Immigrant 
Criminality:  Imprisonment Among First- and Second-Generation Young Men, Migration 
Information Source, June 2006, at 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=403 (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (finding immigrants have lower rates of criminal convictions than 
native-born Americans). 
64. See Chacón, Whose Community Shield?, supra note 3, at 348–49 (discussing ways 
in which migrants are perceived as criminals and how those perceptions increase support 
for harsh immigration laws); see also Legomsky, Asymmetric Incorporation, supra note 1, 
at 507 (describing disconnect between reality of immigrant propensity toward criminal 
behavior and public opinion polls). 
65. Williams Testimony, supra note 40, at 4. 
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to whether all of these pleas are actually “considered and intelligent.”66   
On December 2, 2009, the Ninth Circuit recognized some of these 
problems, concluding that the mass plea agreement procedures of 
Operation Streamline violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, 
which requires the court to “address the defendant personally in open 
court . . . and determine that the plea is voluntary.”
67
  Reviewing the mass 
plea bargaining practice of Operation Streamline, the court concluded 
that “[n]o judge, however conscientious could have possessed the ability 
to hear distinctly and accurately fifty voices at the same time.”
68
  
Nevertheless, in the absence of a finding of prejudice, the convictions on 
appeal were sustained.
69
  So while an appellate court has recognized that 
Rule 11 violations are taking place on a massive scale, it has concluded 
that, absent a showing of individual prejudice, the court will not 
intervene to correct the problem. 
Even by the low standards of the American plea bargaining system, 
the proceedings discussed in this Essay seemingly lack the indicia of 
basic fairness that the Constitution and federal procedural rules purport 
to provide in criminal prosecutions.  Yet these proceedings have 
endured a change in administration, and have reshaped the federal 
criminal docket.  Now, courts are showing little inclination to upset these 
practices, despite their acknowledged procedural flaws. 
CONCLUSIONS:  A CAUSE FOR CONCERN 
The retooling of the criminal justice system to manage migration 
has resulted in some troubling trends.  In this brief Essay, I have 
discussed some features of the plea bargaining systems by which 
immigration convictions are obtained.  Regardless of what one thinks of 
current restrictions on legal immigration, the wholesale retooling of the 
criminal justice system to manage migration that is evinced in these 
examples should raise a host of questions that deserve serious and 
immediate attention:  Is this an effective deterrent to migrants?70  Is it 
worth the monetary price tag?  Is it worth the procedural consequences? 
 
66. Id. at 11.   
67 United States v. Roblero-Solis, No. 08-10396, 2009 WL 4282022, at *7 (9th Cir. 
Dec. 2, 2009) (discussing requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11). 
68 Id. at *8. 
69 Id. at *9 (requiring showing of prejudice and finding “[n]one of these defendants 
has made such a showing or even attempted it”). 
70. Although there are reports that crossings are less numerous since the initiation of 
efforts like Operation Streamline and the proliferation of workplace raids, see, e.g., Passel 
& Cohn, supra note 35, at i, the extent to which this is actually driven by enforcement—as 
opposed to the economic downturn, or the rise in migrants who stay in the United States 
without authorization once they have entered rather than risking multiple border 
crossings—is difficult to ascertain.  Id. at ii.  Given the fact that Streamline, Fast Track, 
and the workplace prosecutions in raids like Postville rely on vastly reduced sentences (in 
the case of Streamline, often approximating time served) to induce plea agreements, it is 
not exactly clear what deterrent effect is served by incarceration.  See also Williams 
Testimony, supra note 40, at 17–22 (questioning Operation Streamline’s deterrent effect). 
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 The ongoing erosion of the procedural rights of these criminal 
defendants thus far has been effectively normalized.  Such procedural 
moves can be framed as nothing more than an extension of long-
standing limitations on the due process rights of noncitizens in 
immigration proceedings.  However, it is important not to lose sight of 
the legal distinctions that separate the criminal from the civil realm.  
The prosecution of these offenses should not be allowed to reshape the 
criminal sphere to look more like the less rights-protective civil system 
where immigration enforcement has typically been centered.  
Unfortunately, at the moment, this is exactly what is happening.  
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